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Abstract
In many industries, firms pre-order input and forward sell output prior to the ac-
tual production period. It is known that forward buying input induces a “Cournot-
Stackelberg endogeneity” (both Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes may result
in equilibrium) and forward selling output induces a convergence to the Bertrand
solution. I analyze the generalized model where firms pre-order input and for-
ward sell output. First, I analyze oligopolists producing homogenous goods,
generalize the Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity to oligopoly, and show that it
additionally includes Bertrand in the generalized model. This shows that the
“mode of competition” between firms may be entirely endogenous. Second, I
consider heterogenous goods in duopolies, which generalizes existing results on
forward sales of output, and derive the outcome set in general duopolies. This
set does not contain the Bertrand solution anymore, but it is well-defined and
shows that forward sales increase welfare also when goods are complements.
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1 Introduction
The paper analyzes oligopolistic industries in a model that explicitly contains plan-
ning periods prior the production period. The model sets in T periods prior to the
production period, e.g. T = 52 weeks prior to the year 2011. In these T preliminary
stages, firms may pre-order input (i.e. pre-build capacity for 2011) and conclude for-
ward contracts to sell the output that they will produce. In the production period, firms
set production quantities and sell the output that was not sold via forward contracts.
Capacities can be extended in the production period, possibly at incremental costs.
This model unifies two streams of literature—the studies of production timing
following Saloner (1987) and those of sales timing following Allaz and Vila (1993).
I consider production timing in the sense of capacity pre-building, e.g. pre-ordering
machinery or raw materials, and allow for sales timing assuming efficient forward
contracts (e.g. to retailers). In many markets, these timing issues interact, but their
interaction has not yet been analyzed and it is therefore unclear whether sales or
production timing dominate from a strategic point of view.
If production timing dominates, then the results on the “Cournot-Stackelberg en-
dogeneity” derived by Saloner (1987), Pal (1991), and Romano and Yildirim (2005)
apply. They have shown that in two-stage games of (quantity) accumulation, a contin-
uum of outcomes may result in equilibrium that contains both Stackelberg outcomes
and the Cournot outcome. The continuum exists if the costs of production do not
change between first and second period. Their analyses assumed that quantity pro-
duced in stage 1 cannot be withheld from being sold in the final stage (stage 2). This
assumption is relaxed in the model of “capacity accumulation” analyzed here, inter-
estingly without notable implications with respect to the equilibrium set.1 From a
more general point of view, their work has shown that industries need not converge
to Cournot equilibrium, that non-cost-related size differences may persist in equilib-
rium, and that Stackelberg leadership can be sustained without asynchronous timing
and without retaliations against deviations of followers (i.e. in stationary equilibria of
1Following Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Saloner (1987), and many subsequent studies, I assume
that the costs of pre-building capacity are sunk in the short term. This implies that capacity is either
constant or accumulates along the path of play and relates the present study to “games of accumulation”
(Romano and Yildirim, 2005).
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repeated games).2
If sales timing dominates, then the results on forward trading in oligopoly, fol-
lowing Allaz and Vila (1993), apply. These results differ strikingly from the Cournot-
Stackelberg endogeneity. Allaz and Vila consider T -stage games where the firms
may sell forward (some of) their eventual output in stages t < T and they set pro-
duction quantities in stage t = T . Contrary to the implications of production timing,
the possibility of sales timing does not affect the dimensionality of the equilibrium
set. The equilibrium outcome is unique, but competition is intensified in relation to
Cournot and the outcome actually converges to Bertrand as T tends to infinity.3 Ma-
henc and Salanié (2004) show that forward trading has the opposite effect—to weaken
competition—if firms compete in prices.
My analysis shows that neither production timing nor sales timing dominates the
other. Rather, the equilibrium structure merges results from both streams of literature.
The outcome set is a continuum that extends the Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity to
additionally include the Allaz-Vila outcome, and in case the goods are homogenous,
the Allaz-Vila outcome converges to the Bertrand outcome as T approaches infinity.
I derive the outcome set for oligopolies producing homogenous goods, which also
shows how the Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity generalizes to oligopoly, and for
duopolies producing heterogenous goods, which additionally provides the Allaz-Vila
prices for heterogenous goods.
These results highlight that the mode of competition may be entirely endogenous
in oligopolistic industries. The various equilibrium outcomes may result in ex-ante
equivalent industries if sales timing and production timing interact. Thus, if firms
anticipate Cournot, then they are best off playing according to Cournot, if firms an-
2Another branch of literature, including e.g. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Robson (1990), and van
Damme and Hurkens (1999), studies endogenous timing in duopoly. As Matsumura (1999) shows,
endogenous Stackelberg does typically not result if there are more than two firms, and in general,
models of endogenous timing are restrictive in the sense that firms can produce only in one of two or
more initially feasible periods. Romano and Yildirim (2005) discuss this in more detail.
3Independently, Bolle (1993) and Powell (1993) reached similar conclusions for T = 2, and to
name a few subsequent studies, Ferreira (2003) derives a Folk theorem for the case that there is no
final trading period, and Liski and Montero (2006) show that forward trades simplify penal strategies
and tacit collusion in repeated oligopoly.
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ticipate Stackelberg (with an arbitrary leader-follower assignment), then Stackelberg
results, and so on. The firms’ anticipations, in turn, may be given by historical prece-
dents or social norms. The set of equilibrium outcomes will be characterized using a
novel indexation of oligopoly equilibria that is derived from the first order conditions.
The indexation links the classic modes of competition—Cournot, Bertrand, Stackel-
berg, and Allaz-Vila—in terms of conjectural variations and the equilibrium analysis
rationalizes the corresponding conjectures. Finally, the analysis shows that forward
trading of quantity setting firms is socially efficient in general (i.e. also in case the
goods are complements), which was questionable after Mahenc and Salanié (2004)
had shown that it softens competition between price setting firms.
Section 2 defines the notation. Section 3 derives requisite preliminary results,
introduces the equilibrium index, and extends the basic Cournot-Stackelberg endo-
geneity to oligopoly. Section 4 analyzes the general model of oligopolists producing
homogenous goods, Section 5 concerns the case of duopolists producing heteroge-
nous goods. Section 6 concludes. The proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The base model
Initially we focus on two-stage oligopoly games in markets for homogenous goods.
Further notation will be introduced when we augment the base model. Firms are
denoted as i ∈ N = {1, . . . ,n}. In stage 1, the planning phase, the firms choose “ca-
pacities” zi (i.e. they order the respective amounts of input factors) and they conclude
forward contracts for yi units of output (e.g. with retailers). In stage 2, the production
phase, they choose the quantities xi to be produced. The players act simultaneously
in each stage, and the choices made in stage 1 are common knowledge in stage 2.
The unit costs of pre-building capacity are γi ≥ 00. In case a quantity xi > zi is cho-
sen in stage 2, the pre-built capacity is extended at unit costs ci ≥ γi. There are no
costs of production besides the costs of capacity. The inverse demand function is
p(x) = a− b∑i∈N xi. The forward sales are priced competitively in that the even-
tually resulting market price is anticipated correctly. Throughout this paper scalar
values and functions are set in italics, e.g. capacities zi, vectors are set in boldface
type, e.g. z = (zi)i∈N , sets of scalars are denoted by capital letters, e.g. Zi 3 zi, and
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sets of vectors are denoted by capital letters set in boldface type, e.g. Z =×i∈N Zi.
Definition 2.1 (Base game). Strategy profiles are triples (z,y,x) = (zi,yi,xi)i∈N . In
stage 1, firms (i ∈ N) set capacities zi ∈ Zi ⊆ R+ and forward sales yi ∈ Yi ⊆ R+, and
in stage 2, they set quantities xi : Z×Y→ Xi ⊆ R+. In stage 2, the forward trades
have been concluded at price p f and the short-term profit of i is
ΠSi (x|z,y) = (xi− yi) ·
(
a−b∑ j x j
)
+ p f · yi− ci ·max{xi(z,y)− zi,0}− γizi. (1)
The assumption that profitable arbitrage is impossible in equilibrium follows Allaz
and Vila (1993) and implies that the market price for forward trades equates with the
anticipated market price conditional on the choices of (z,y), i.e.
p f (x|z,y) = a−b · ∑
j∈N
x j(z,y). (2)
Substituting p f in Eq. (1), the stage-1 (long term) profit function of i ∈ N becomes
ΠLi (z,y,x) = xi(z,y)∗ p
(
x|z,y)− ci ·max{xi(z,y)− zi,0}− γizi. (3)
We focus on subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) in pure strategies.
3 Preliminary analysis and benchmark results
Outcome uniqueness in production phase
In the last round, the production phase, the firms choose quantities (xi) contingent on
their capacity pre-builds (zi) and forward sales (yi). In standard Cournot models with
linear demands, the quantities chosen in equilibrium are unique. Our model assumes
quantity competition and linear demands, too, but the discontinuity at the capacity
limit implies that uniqueness in the production phase is less obvious than in standard
models. Establishing outcome uniqueness in the production phase is important, how-
ever, to understand that the indeterminacy of the mode of competition originates in
the planning phase (as one would expect) rather than the production phase.
Our first result establishes outcome uniqueness in the production phase, and in
addition it characterizes the equilibrium outcome. To gain intuition, define the indi-
cator Ixi>zi , i.e. it evaluates to 1 iff xi > zi, and consider the marginal profit of i. This
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derivative is well defined for all xi 6= zi.
∂ΠSi
∂xi
= p−b(xi− yi)− ci · Ixi>zi (4)
The marginal profit is piecewise linear in xi and discontinuous at xi = zi. The non-
standard characteristic of capacity pre-builds is that, if xi = zi, the marginal revenue
MRi = p− b(xi− yi) may attain any value in [0,ci] without violating individual ra-
tionality. If MRi ≥ 0, firm i cannot gain by reducing quantity (no costs are saved by
doing so if xi≤ zi), and if MRi≤ ci, increasing quantity does not pay off either (to this
end, the capacity would have to be extended, but the respective unit costs ci would
not be covered). Thus, the equilibrium condition is not p− bxi = ci as in standard
Cournot models or p−b(xi− yi) = ci as in standard Allaz-Vila models, but
p−b(xi− yi) = 0, if xi < zi (5)
p−b(xi− yi) ∈ [0,ci], if xi = zi (6)
p−b(xi− yi) = ci, if xi > zi (7)
for all i ∈ N. Overall, the first order conditions are less restrictive than those of mod-
els without capacity pre-builds, but as I show in the appendix, outcome uniqueness
in the production phase can be established nonetheless. As we will see below, the
relaxation of equilibrium conditions implies that outcome non-uniqueness may result
in the planning phase.
Lemma 3.1. Fix any (z,y). The equilibrium quantities x∗i (z,y) are unique for all
i ∈ N and satisfy, using ri = a−b
(
2zi− yi+ x∗−i
)
and x∗−i = ∑ j 6=i x∗j ,
x∗i (z,y) =

zi+ ri2b , if ri < 0
zi, if 0≤ ri ≤ ci
zi+ ri−ci2b , if ri > ci.
(8)
The characterization of the stage 2 equilibrium rests on (ri), which denotes the
hypothetical short-term marginal revenue at xi = zi. If ri < 0, then i does not exploit
the pre-built capacity (x∗i < zi), i chooses x∗i = zi if ri ∈ [0,ci], and it extends capacity
(x∗i > zi) if ri > ci.
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No excess capacity
Varying the capacity zi of firm i in Lemma 3.1, we observe a capacity effect, i.e. a
tendency to exactly use the pre-built capacity. For, xi = zi is optimal whenever ri is
in [0,ci], and if ri is in the interior of [0,ci], then small increments of zi keep ri in the
interior [0,ci]—which implies that the incremented capacity would still be exploited.
To further illustrate, let MRSi = ∂R
S
i /∂xi denote i’s short-term marginal revenue (as
above), and let MRLi = ∂RLi /∂zi be i’s long-term marginal revenue.
MRSi = a−b∑
j
x j−b(xi− yi) MRLi = a−b∑
j
x j−bxi (9)
The difference between MRSi and MR
L
i is the forward trade effect originally described
by Allaz and Vila (1993). As yi increases, the quantity that is left to be sold in stage
2 shrinks and hence the MR in the short term increases. This effect implies MRSi ≥
MRLi in general and MR
S
i > MR
L
i if yi > 0. In light of this, one might suspect that
if yi is large enough, then MRL ≤ γi and MRS > ci could hold true simultaneously.
In this case, firm i would be best off delaying capacity investments until stage 2.
The next result shows that capacity investments are neither delayed nor excessive in
equilibrium (if ci > γi). Along the equilibrium path, firms exactly exploit their pre-
built capacity.
Lemma 3.2. Fix any SPE (z∗,y∗,x∗). For all i ∈ N, the quantity chosen along the
equilibrium path satisfies x∗i (z∗,y∗)≥ z∗i , and in case ci > γi it satisfies x∗i (z∗,y∗) = z∗i .
The case ci = γi is a little more complex. As the formulation of Lemma 3.2
suggests, capacity may be extended in stage 2 if ci = γi. Lemma 4.2 proved below
shows that the set of equilibrium outcomes is unaffected by this effect.
Basic oligopoly models and implied conjectural derivatives
If the pre-built capacity cannot be extended in stage 2, i.e. if ci = ∞ for all i ∈ N,
then the forward trade effect disappears. In this case, the Cournot outcome results.
This shows that a necessary condition for the competition-enhancing effect of forward
trades is that capacity can be extended after output had been sold forward. The first
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order conditions in the Cournot model and the Cournot price are, using p= a−b∑ j z j
and assuming an interior solution exists (i.e. p > γi for all i ∈ N),
p−bzi− γi = 0 ∀i ∈ N, ⇒ pC =
a+∑ j∈N γ j
1+n
. (10)
Secondly, if capacity cannot be pre-built, the framework of Allaz and Vila (1993) re-
sults. If we assume, for notational clarity, that ci = γi applies (since γi as used before is
irrelevant when capacity cannot be pre-built), then the first order conditions on quan-
tities (xi) contingent on (yi) are p−b(xi− yi)− γi = 0 for all i ∈ N. If we solve these
conditions for (xi), and represent the resulting conditions for optimal (yi) in terms of
the induced capacities zi, then the following reduced-form first order conditions of the
Allaz-Vila model are obtained.
p− 1
n
·bzi− γi = 0 ∀i ∈ N, ⇒ pAV = a+n∑i∈N γi1+n2 . (11)
These two sets of first order conditions, Eqs. (10) and (11), can be represented as
p−λibzi− γi = 0 ∀i ∈ N (12)
for certain (λi)∈RN+. The first order conditions in the Cournot-model are obtained for
λ1 = · · ·= λn = 1, and the Allaz-Vila conditions correspond with λ1 = · · ·= λn = 1/n.
The equilibrium price and profits associated with arbitrary (λi) are
p =
a+∑iλ−1i γi
1+∑iλ−1i
, Πi =
1
λib
·
(
a− γi+∑ j λ−1j (γ j− γi)
1+∑ j λ−1j
)2
. (13)
Throughout this paper, I will represent models and equilibrium outcomes by such
profiles (λi) ∈ RN+. These (λi) relate straightforwardly to conjectural derivatives: λi
describes how the aggregate market quantity increases if i increases xi by a unit. In
the Cournot model, the aggregate quantity increases by a unit, but in the Allaz-Vila
model, an increase of the amount of forward trades induces an increase of the own
quantity which in turn crowds out the opponents’ quantities. The ratio of the resulting
increase of the overall quantity to the increase of the own quantity is λi = 1/n in the
Allaz-Vila model.
To clarify the relation to conjectural derivatives, let xi denote the quantity of i and
x−i the aggregate quantity of i’s opponents. If players compete by choosing quantities
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in a market with inverse demand P(xi+x−i), then i’s first order condition is (assuming
constant marginal costs γi)
P− xi ·P′(xi+ x−i) ·
(
1+ dx−idxi
)
− γi = 0. (14)
P = a−b∑i xi implies P′(q) =−b, and hence λi = 1+ dx−idxi =
d(x−i+xi)
dxi
.
To conclude this overview, consider the (λi) implied in Stackelberg games.
Definition 3.3 (Stackelberg games). For any partition (Nt)t≤T = (N1,N2, . . . ,NT ) of
N, define the (Nt)t≤T -Stackelberg game as the T -round extensive form game of per-
fect information where the players i ∈ Nt simultaneously move (choosing quantities)
in round t, for all t = 1, . . . ,T .
Lemma 3.4. Assume γi = γ j for all i, j ∈ N. The equilibrium profits of the players in
any (Nt)t≤T -Stackelberg game are given by Eq. (13) using λi =∏Tt ′=t+1
1
|Nt′ |+1 for all
i ∈ Nt and all t ≤ T .
Thus, Stackelberg followers i∈NT have conjectural derivatives λi = 1 that corre-
spond with those of Cournot oligopolists (they play their best responses). Allaz-Vila
oligopolists have conjectural derivatives that are equivalent to those of singleton first
movers, i.e. to those in
({i},N \{i})-Stackelberg games where all opponents of i are
equally ranked followers.4
The Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity
The “Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity” (Romano and Yildirim, 2005) was originally
derived by Saloner (1987). He assumed that quantity can be pre-built and showed that
a continuum of outcomes containing the Stackelberg outcomes and the Cournot out-
come may result if c = γ. Pal (1991) showed that the Cournot-Stackelberg endogene-
ity disappears as c 6= γ. Correspondingly, I distinguish the cases (i) ci > γi for all i and
(ii) ci = γi for all i. The first main result, Proposition 3.5, shows how the observations
of Saloner and Pal generalize to the oligopoly case, and that they hold true even if
4As for two-player games, this link was previously established by Allaz and Vila (1993, Prop.
2.2). They showed that if only one oligopolist may sell forward in their two-period game, then the
Stackelberg outcome results.
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quantity produced in stage 1 can be withheld from being sold on the market in stage
2 (i.e. if we consider “capacity accumulation” rather than “quantity accumulation”).
This is not obvious, and in fact questioned by Saloner (1987, p. 186f).
Prior to stating the result, let me illustrate why a continuum of equilibria exists
in case c = γ. Saloner considered the case of two players, and expressed in terms
of (λi) as defined above, he showed that all outcomes associated with (λ1,λ2) where
λ1 ∈ [1/2,1) and λ2 = 1 can result in equilibrium. In this case, 1/2≤ λ1 < 1 implies
that firm 1 chooses a capacity somewhere between that of a Stackelberg leader and
that of a Cournot duopolist, and λ2 = 1 implies that 2 plays the best response. In
a pure Cournot framework, firm 1 would benefit by decreasing his quantity, but in
the two-stage game considered here, firm 2 would respond by increasing the capacity
in stage 2 in case c2 = γ2. Hence, decreasing capacity pays off for firm 1 only if it
pays off for a Stackelberg leader. The latter, however, cannot be the case if Eq. (12)
holds true for λ1 ≥ 1/2. In turn, player 1 does not benefit from increasing capacity
when Eq. (12) is satisfied for some λ1 ≤ 1. For, firm 2 does not respond to a capacity
increase of 1 by decreasing his quantity in stage 2 as long as λ2 > 0 (i.e. as long
as i’s marginal revenue is positive). To summarize: 1’s incentives correspond with
those of a Cournot duopolist with respect to capacity increases and with those of
Stackelberg followers with respect to capacity decreases. Hence, λ1 may attain any
value in [1/2,1] in equilibrium.
Proposition 3.5 (Zero forward trades). Assume “sufficiently similar” (see below)
marginal costs (γi) and Yi = {0} for all i ∈ N.
1. If ci > γi for all i ∈ N, then the Cournot outcome results in the unique SPE.
2. If ci = γi for all i ∈ N, then an outcome 〈p,(Πi)〉 can result if and only if there
exists a partition (N1,N2) of N such that 〈p,(Πi)〉 satisfies Eq. (13) for some
(λi) where λi ∈
[
1
|N2|+1 ,1
]
for all i ∈ N1 and λ j = 1 for all j ∈ N2.
The (γi) are “sufficiently similar” to sustain price p if p > γi for all i ∈ N.
The set of equilibrium outcomes is a continuum containing the outcomes of all
two-stage Stackelberg games5 and the Cournot outcome. The set is not convex in
5Any two-stage Stackelberg game is defined by a partition (N1,N2) of N where all i ∈ N1 move
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the payoff space, but it is the union of finitely many hyperrectangles in (λi)-space.
Namely, it is the union, over all (N1,N2)-Stackelberg games, of the hyperrectangles
containing the respective (N1,N2)-Stackelberg outcome and the Cournot outcome.
For example, in three-player games, the set of outcomes is the union of six hyperrect-
angles (as there are six two-stage Stackelberg games between three players), where
each hyperrectangle has a Stackelberg solution and the Cournot solution at its corner
points.
The set of two-stage Stackelberg games contains all Stackelberg games if we fo-
cus on duopolies, as Saloner (1987), Pal (1991), and Romano and Yildirim (2005)
did, but it is incomplete if there are more than two firms. Proposition 3.5 thus shows
that the Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity is incomplete in n-player games of accu-
mulation. The following section shows that the Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity can
be reestablished (slightly weakened) in the more general game allowing for both ca-
pacity accumulation and forward trades.
4 Oligopoly with homogenous goods
The two-stage game
Initially we focus on the “generic” case ci > γi for all i. The extension toward ci = γi
for all i is covered below. The main result, Proposition 4.1, shows that the set of
equilibrium outcomes is a hypercube in (λi)-space, with the Cournot solution (λi = 1
for all i) and the Allaz-Vila solution (λi = 1/n for all i) at its opposite corner points.
It contains all two-stage Stackelberg outcomes and many intermediate outcomes. The
set of equilibrium outcomes is only “quasi-hyperrectangular” in the payoff space, i.e.
neither convex nor hyperrectangular (see also Figure 1).
Proposition 4.1. Assume ci > γi for all i∈N and fix a price p∈R such that p> ci > γi
for all i ∈ N. This price can result in an SPE if and only if there exists (λi) ∈
[1
n ,1
]N
such that p satisfies Eq. (13), and the corresponding profit profile is Π according to
Eq. (13).
in round 1 and all j ∈ N2 move in round 2. By Lemma 3.4, the solution is characterized by λi =
1/(|N2|+1) for all first-movers i ∈ N1 and λ j = 1 for all followers j ∈ N2.
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Figure 1: Range of profit profiles that may result in equilibrium (two players, zero
costs)
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To capture the intuition, let us look at the structure of the equilibria constructed
in the proof (further equilibria exist, but they do not induce alternative outcomes). Fix
(λi) ∈
[1
n ,1
]N
and find the unique capacities (zi)i∈N such that
p−λibzi− γi = 0 ∀i ∈ N, (15)
at the respective market price p = a−b∑i zi. See e.g. Eq. (40). Set (yi)i∈N such that
p−b(zi− yi)− ci = 0 ∀i ∈ N. (16)
Since λi > 0, corresponding yi exist even if ci > γi.6 All such strategy profiles (z,y)
can be extended to SPEs through the appropriate x∗ (see Lemma 3.1). By Lemma
3.2, x∗i = z∗i results along the path of play for all i ∈ N, and as a result of Eq. (16), the
stage 2 marginal revenue is ri = ci for all i ∈ N. When any i ∈ N deviates unilaterally
by increasing zi in stage 1, then he will be best off exploiting the extended capacity
in stage 2 (his marginal revenue falls below ci but remains positive). Anticipating
this quantity increase after observing the capacity “increase” of i, the opponents’
marginal revenues fall below marginal costs c j, but they remain positive, too. Hence,
6To be precise, such (yi) exist if ci ≤ pAV for all i ∈ N. Eq. (16) cannot be satisfied if ci > p.
Assuming ci = c for all i, pAV ≤ c≤ pC implies that the equilibrium price range is the interval
[
c, pC
]
.
If c > pC, short-term capacity are effectively prohibitive, and the Cournot outcome results.
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the opponents’ quantities are constant in response to i’s capacity increase, and thus,
i’s capacity increase pays off if and only if it would pay off for a Cournot oligopolist.
The latter applies iff
p−bzi− γi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N. (17)
Alternatively, i may cut capacity. The most profitable capacity cut implies that i
simultaneously adjusts yi so that he will not be best off extending capacity in stage
2 again. Regardless of yi, however, the opponents’ marginal revenues in stage 2 rise
above c j due to the capacity cut (i.e. due to correctly anticipating the quantity cut that
follows), and hence they all respond by extending their capacities in stage 2. In turn,
capacity cuts pay off if and only if a quantity cut pays for a Stackelberg leader to
which all n−1 opponents respond by acting simultaneously. This applies iff
p− 1
n
bzi− γi ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N. (18)
Since Eq. (15) is satisfied for some λi ∈
[
1/n,1
]
, neither Eq. (17) nor Eq. (18) can be
satisfied, i.e. neither capacity cuts nor capacity extensions pay off if λi ∈
[
1/n,1
]
.
The generalized Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity
Lemma 4.2 establishes that Proposition 4.1 extends to the degenerate case c = γ.
Lemma 4.2. Assume (γi) are sufficiently similar. The set of outcomes that can be
sustained in equilibrium is upper hemicontinuous in (ci) if ci ≥ γi for all i ∈ N.
This result shows that the Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity is general, i.e. nei-
ther degenerate nor generic, in the games discussed presently.
Additionally, by Lemma 3.4, an equilibrium of a general (N1, . . . ,NT )-Stackelberg
game corresponds with an equilibrium according to Proposition 4.1 if and only if
∏Tt=2
1
|Nt |+1 ≥ 1/n. This includes many Stackelberg outcomes, even of Stackelberg
games with more than two stages, but not all of them. As an example of a Stackelberg
outcome that is included, consider the ({1},{2},{3,4})-Stackelberg game, i.e. the
game where 1 moves first, 2 moves second, while 3 and 4 simultaneously move last.
By Lemma 3.4, its equilibrium is characterized as λ1 = 14 , λ2 =
1
2 , and λ3 = λ4 = 1,
which satisfies λi ≥ 1/n for all four players. In turn, the Stackelberg outcome of the
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game where n = 3 players move strictly sequential (player 1 moves first, 2 moves
second, 3 moves third) is not included. By Lemma 3.4, its equilibrium is character-
ized as λ1 = 14 , λ2 =
1
2 , and λ3 = 1, which in this case violates λi ≥ 1n for all i. Then
again, its outcome is weakly Pareto dominated by the Cournot outcome and strictly
Pareto dominated by other equilibrium outcomes compatible with Proposition 4.1—
and based on the Pareto criterion, it is possible to generalize the Cournot-Stackelberg
endogeneity.
The following result establishes the corresponding generalization: equilibria of
general (N1, . . . ,NT )-Stackelberg games are either compatible with Proposition 4.1 or
they are Pareto dominated by an outcome compatible with Proposition 4.1.
Lemma 4.3. Assume γi = γ j for all i, j ∈ N. Not all equilibrium outcomes of gen-
eral (Nt)t≤T -Stackelberg games correspond with equilibrium outcomes according to
Proposition 4.1. All those that do not are Pareto dominated by some equilibrium
outcome compatible with Proposition 4.1.
The T -stage game
Now assume that the number T of rounds in the planning phase prior to the production
phase is increased. For example, production in 2020 may not just be planned in
2019 (by forward buying input and forward selling output), but already in 2018, or
even 2017, and so on. Alternatively, T increases if the length of the preliminary
planning periods is shortened, from years to say quarters. Allaz and Vila (1993) show
that the forward trade effect intensifies as T increases, with the consequence that the
equilibrium price converges to the Bertrand price as T approaches infinity. Romano
and Yildirim (2005), in turn, show that solutions of accumulation games are invariant
with respect to T , i.e. the set of equilibrium outcomes is independent of the number
of accumulation periods T . The game analyzed in this paper allows for both of these
effects. The following results show that neither of these effects dominates the other
in the sense that the Pareto frontier of the equilibrium set is invariant with respect to
T , whereas the lower bound converges to the Bertrand outcome.
In the following, the game with T planning periods is denoted as Γ(T ). We focus
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on Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs),7 and make two additional assumptions. The
marginal costs are identical γ1 = · · · = γn, as competitive pricing is not well-defined
in the case of heterogenous marginal costs, and ci = γi for all i ∈ N for notational
convenience (otherwise, the price is bounded below by c, see also Footnote 6).
Our first result relates to the T -invariance observed by Romano and Yildirim
(2005). It shows that the set of outcomes of Γ(T ) is a subset of the outcomes of
Γ(T +1). Hence, the outcomes of Γ(T ) are included in the set of outcomes of Γ(T + l)
for all l ≥ 1, i.e. the earlier the firms start planning the production period, the larger
the set of possible equilibrium outcomes.
Lemma 4.4. For all T ≥ 1 and any payoff profile Π ∈ RN that results in an MPE of
Γ(T ), there exists an MPE of Γ(T +1) that results in the same payoff profile.
Hence, T -invariance of accumulation games remains partially intact in capacity
accumulation—equilibria do not disappear as T increases. To gain intuition, consider
an MPE of Γ(T ). At the end of round T , all firms have concluded their planning
phase, i.e. their plans (forward trades and pre-built capacities) are mutual best re-
sponses. We can now construct a strategy profile of Γ(T +1) that replicates the moves
in all rounds t ≤ T of the considered MPE, and loosely speaking everything is held
constant in round T + 1. The proof of Lemma 4.4 shows that the mutual optimality
of the plans in Γ(T ) implies that the players may not gain by deviating unilaterally
in round T +1 of Γ(T +1), and based on this, we can construct an outcome-invariant
strategy profile that is an MPE of Γ(T +1).
However, while the players are best off not to deviate unilaterally from an equi-
librium of Γ(T ) in round T + 1, they may well be best off deviating from the Γ(T )-
plans in Γ(T + 1) if all opponents are doing so. That is, either all firms effectively
conclude their planning phase after round T or they do so after round T + 1. This
implies that all equilibria of Γ(T ) can be characterized by an integer T ∗ ≤ T which
denotes the effective duration of the planning phase and a vector (λi) of implicit con-
jectural derivatives. By varying T ∗ and (λi), the general continuum of equilibrium
7The players’ strategies depend on the cumulative amounts of pre-built capacity and forward trades,
and on the current round index t ≤ T , but they do not depend on the actual move sequence detailing
how the cumulative amounts have been reached. By definition, all MPEs are also SPEs, and thus the
set of outcomes that can result in SPEs includes at least the outcomes derived below.
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Figure 2: Set of equilibrium profit profiles for T ≥ 1 (assuming a = b = 1 and γ= 0)
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outcomes is obtained.
Proposition 4.5. Fix T ≥ 1 and γ = γi = ci for all i ∈ N. The Pareto frontier of the
equilibrium profits in Γ(T ) equates with the one of Proposition 4.1, and as T tends
to infinity the minimal equilibrium price converges to marginal costs γ. Price p and
profit profile Π ∈ RN can result in an MPE of Γ(T ) if and only if there exist T ∗ ≤ T
and λ ∈ [1n ,1]N such that
p =
a+β1γ
1+β1
and Πi =
α1i +λ
−1
i
b
(p− γ)2 (19)
where βT ∗ = ∑iλ−1i and for all t ≤ T ∗,
βt = βT
∗
+
[
n+(n−2)βT ∗]T ∗−t∑
τ=1
(n−1)τ−1, (20)
αti =
T ∗
∑
τ=t+1
(1+βτ−2λ−1i )∗ (−1)T
∗−τ+1. (21)
The respective capacities/quantities and amounts of forward trades can be com-
puted straightforwardly, as a function of 〈T ∗,(λi)〉, as detailed in the proof of Proposi-
tion 4.5. A graphical representation of the set of equilibrium outcomes in a two-player
case is provided in Figure 2. It is rather easy to distinguish the various components of
the outcome set, i.e. the components that relate to equilibria with effective duration of
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the planning phase T ∗ = 1, T ∗ = 2, and so on. The set of equilibrium outcomes cor-
responding with any T ∗ ≤ T form a hyperrectangle in (λi)-space, and the intersection
of succeeding hyperrectangles consists of exactly one point (i.e. the components are
not disconnected nor do they overlap).8
Proposition 4.5 shows that the mode of competition is fully endogenous if the
firms produce homogeneous goods. The time invariance of accumulation implies that
the Pareto-frontier establishing the Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity remains in the
equilibrium set, while the the competitiveness of forward trades implies that the lower
bound approaches the Bertrand equilibrium as T grows. The next section examines
whether this continues to hold true as we allow for heterogeneous goods.
5 Duopoly with heterogenous goods
The assumption that goods be perfect substitutes is invalid if mere transportation costs
are taken into account, and obviously it is outright wrong if complements such as coal
and iron ore are considered. Interactions of firms forward selling heterogenous goods
are unexplored in the existing literature, however. By a similar token, the robustness
of the convergence toward Bertrand competition as T grows, as described by Allaz
and Vila, with respect to relaxations of perfect homogeneity is an open question. I
will analyze these issues by assuming the following inverse demands for i = 1,2 and
j = 3− i.9
pi(xi,x j) = a−b1xi−b2x j (22)
The case of complementary goods (b2 < 0) induces a constituent game that exhibits
strategic complements, and thereby may relate to the forward trade model of price
setting duopolists analyzed by Mahenc and Salanié (2004). They found that the firms
go long in the futures market (forward buying their own output). This will not result
in our model, and in this way, the case of quantity setting duopolists producing com-
8The equilibrium outcome corresponding with T ∗ and λi = 1/n∀i equates with the outcome corre-
sponding with T ∗+1 and λi = 1∀i.
9I focus on duopolies for tractability. In case goods are heterogenous, the equation system defined
by the first order conditions has to be solved directly, which becomes intractable for n> 2 and prevents
closed form solutions for general n.
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plements differs from price setting duopolists producing substitutes (although both
games exhibit strategic complements). Technically, the analysis is very similar to the
one made above, and for this reason, the main results are stated immediately.
Proposition 5.1. Assume |N|= 2, |b1|> |b2|, and pi = a−b1xi−b2x j for all i ∈ N.
For all T ∗ ≤ T and λi ∈ [1− b22/2b21,1], there exists an equilibrium of the T -round
game inducing the prices
pi =
(1+b1µ1j)(a+b1µ
1
i γi+b2µ1jγ j)−b2µ1j(a j +b1µ1jγ j +b2µ1i γi)
(1+b1µ1i )(1+b1µ
1
j)−b22µ1i µ1j
(23)
for all i ∈ N (provided pi > ci for all i), using µT ∗i = λ−1i b−11 and
∀t ≤ T ∗ : rti =
−b1(1+b1µtj)+b22µtj
(1+b1µti)(1+b1µ
t
j)−b22µtiµtj
∀t < T ∗ : µti =−µt+1i −1/rt+1i .
The following is implied.
1. As T ∗ tends to infinity, µ1i converges to µ = (b21−b22)−1/2 for all i. This limit is
strictly below µB = b1/(b21−b22) which is implicit in price competition.
2. The amount sold forward in planning period t of an equilibrium inducing price
pi equates with (pi− γi)∗ (µti−µt+1i ) and is strictly positive.
3. Fix λ1 = λ2. The equilibrium prices are decreasing in T ∗.
Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium profits for a variety of cases. The main observa-
tion is that the iterated forward trade effect—convergence toward competitive pricing
as T approaches infinity—is not robust to relaxing homogeneity of goods. If b2 drops
to b2/b1 = 0.9, then the profits converge half-way between Cournot and Bertrand
profits, and in this case, the Bertrand profits are far from being competitive already.
Hence, the observation that forward trading induces competitive pricing if T grows
cannot be confirmed in general.
In turn, the results show that forward trading of quantity setting duopolists bene-
fits consumers even when the goods are complements. This contrasts with the results
Mahenc and Salanié (2004), who analyzed price setting duopolists producing substi-
tutes and found that the firms go long and tacitly collude in equilibrium. They argued
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Figure 3: Equilibrium profits if goods are heterogenous (a = b1 = 1, γ1 = γ2 = 0)
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Note: The “Allaz-Vila” price refers to the limit as T approaches infinity.
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that this observation relates to the fact that price competition exhibits strategic com-
plements, but as b2 < 0 in Proposition 5.1 exhibits strategic complements, too, this
relation is weaker than suspected. For, we observe convergence to price competition
(and lower prices, see Point 3 of Proposition 5.1) even in this case, while Mahenc and
Salanié observe the opposite in their price setting game. Finally, since Bertrand com-
petition benefits both consumers (lower prices) and firms (higher profits) in case the
goods are complements, we can conclude that forward trading raises welfare regard-
less of whether goods are complements or substitutes—provided firms set quantities.
6 Concluding discussion
The paper presents the first analysis of an industry where firms do both, pre-order in-
put and forward contract output, prior to the production period. Pre-ordering input al-
lows firms to pre-build capacity (cumulatively, following e.g. Kreps and Scheinkman,
1983, and Saloner, 1987) and forward contracting with say retailers allows firms to
improve their short-term marginal revenue and hence their strategic positioning in the
production period (the “forward trade effect” of Allaz and Vila, 1993).
The main contributions can be summarized as follows. The Cournot-Stackelberg
endogeneity (Saloner, 1987; Pal, 1991; Romano and Yildirim, 2005) is shown to be
robust to capacity accumulation (as opposed to quantity accumulation) and general-
ized to oligopolistic industries, which shows that the endogeneity is incomplete in
oligopolistic games of accumulation. The T -round Allaz-Vila prices are derived for
duopolists producing heterogenous goods, which allowed me to show that they do
not converge to the Bertrand prices in general, and yet forward trades are welfare
improving even in case the goods are complements. Finally, the outcome set of the
joined model is characterized using a novel indexation of oligopoly equilibria and
it is shown to consist of T hyperrectangles stretching from the Cournot-Stackelberg
frontier on one end to the Allaz-Vila price on the other end (which generalizes the
Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity).
Since the Allaz-Vila price converges to the Bertrand price in case the goods are
homogenous, the “mode of competition” may therefore be entirely independent of
“objective differences” between markets—to the degree that different focal points or
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historical standards do not constitute objective differences—and different modes are
fully self-sustaining in the sense that repeated interaction and complex penal codes
are not required.
The assumptions made above are fairly standard. For example, linear demand
and constant marginal costs are standard and can be generalized in several ways,
although closed-form solutions may then be unavailable (note also the conditions
for existence of Cournot equilibria, e.g. Novshek, 1980). Similarly, the assumption
that capacity accumulates, i.e. that capacity investments represent sunk costs at later
stages, is standard. An issue that deserves more discussion relates to the point raised
by Pal (1996) who argues, in the context of two-period Cournot games, that asymmet-
ric equilibria seem implausible in symmetric games. Note that we do not argue that
say specific Stackelberg equilibria necessarily result in specific industries, but that
asymmetric outcomes may be sustained in stationary equilibrium points of industries
with ex-ante symmetric firms. Such industries may well have historically established
leadership and follower assignments, even if firms do not move asynchronously, and
since the equilibria are shown to be self-sustaining, such role assignments need not
disappear over time even if firm owners or managers tend to think myopically (low δ,
hence no Folk theorem) or tend to act stationarily or forward-looking (which rules out
the possibility of retaliations against firms that deviated from acting as say followers).
To conclude, let me recall that the present paper analyzed a model of compe-
tition, and as such, it does not rationalize everything. That is, it generates several
falsifiable predictions. As Figures 2 and 3 show, the relative profits of different firms
are correlated and bounded in equilibrium (though the correlation weakens as the
number of firms grows). Similarly, there is a falsifiable mapping from implicit con-
jectural derivatives (= 1−λi as discussed above) to the set of outcomes. Empirical
tests of these predictions may be a topic for further research.
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A Proofs of results in Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1 Fix (z,y). For all i ∈ N, define the intervals X ′i = [yi,xi] such
that a− bxi = 0. The best response of i to x−i ∈ X−i is unique, continuous in x−i,
and necessarily satisfies xi ∈ X ′i . Since X ′i is compact, closed, and convex for all i ∈
N, existence of a pure strategy equilibrium (x∗i )i=1,...,n follows from Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem. Eq. (8) represents the necessary conditions for a profile of mutual best
responses, which therefore have to be satisfied in any equilibrium x∗. We have to show
that the equilibrium is unique. For any equilibrium x∗ there exist sets N−,N+ ⊆ N,
with N−∩N+ = /0, such that
x∗i < zi for i ∈ N−, x∗i = zi for i /∈ N−∪N+, x∗i > zi for i ∈ N+. (24)
Define m and k such that, relabeling the players appropriately, the sets are N− =
{1, . . . ,m} and N+= {k+1, . . . ,n}. Using the necessary condition Eq. (8), x∗ solves a
linear (m+n−k)–dimensional equation system with the solution (x∗1, . . . ,x∗m,x∗k+1, . . . ,x∗n).
x∗1
.
x∗m
x∗k+1
.
x∗n

=

2s
s+1 . − 2s+1 − 2s+1 . − 2s+1
. . . . . .
− 2s+1 . 2ss+1 − 2s+1 . − 2s+1
− 2s+1 . − 2s+1 2ss+1 . − 2s+1
. . . . . .
− 2s+1 . − 2s+1 − 2s+1 . 2ss+1

×

a+by1
2b
.
a+bym
2b
a−ck+1+byk+1
2b
.
a−cn+byn
2b

(25)
where s := m+n−k. In turn, any pair N−,N+ defines a unique set of necessary con-
ditions Eq. (8) and has a unique solution x∗ through Eq. (25). Hence, the equilibrium
is unique if N− and N+ are unique. Fix any pair N−,N+ such that an equilibrium
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is induced. By Eq. (8), N− contains the players i ∈ N that have the lowest values of
a+byi
2b . Hence, if j /∈ N−, then he must have a greater value of
a+by j
2b .
i ∈ N− and j /∈ N− ⇒ a+byi
2b
<
a+by j
2b
. (26)
Also by Eq. (8), N+ contains the players i∈N with the largest a−ci+byi2b , which implies
i ∈ N+ and j /∈ N+ ⇒ a− ci+byi
2b
>
a− c j +by j
2b
. (27)
If (z,y) and c are given, then the m players with the lowest values of a+by j2b are
identified, as are the n− k players with the highest values of a−ci+byi2b . Hence, the
sets N−,N+ are uniquely defined through pairs (m,k) satisfying m := |N−| and k :=
n−|N+|, and thus, for any (m,k), there is a unique solution x∗ satisfying Eqs. (8) and
(25). Now pick any equilibrium x∗ and for contradiction assume that it is not unique.
An equilibrium x∗′ 6= x∗ exists which is characterized by N′−,N′+ where
x∗i
′ < zi for i ∈ N′−, x∗i ′ = zi for i /∈ N′−∪N′+, x∗i ′ > zi for i ∈ N′+. (28)
Further, define m′ := |N′−| and k′ := n− |N′+|. If x∗′ 6= x∗, then (m′,n′) 6= (m,n)
follows from the previous argument. Without loss of generality assume m′>m, which
implies N′− ⊃ N−. We first show that N′+ ⊃ N+ follows. Define ∆x∗i := x∗i ′− x∗i for
all i. This implies ∆x∗i < 0 for all i ∈ N′− \N−. Putting the solution Eq. (25) for
N′−,N′+ in relation to that for N−,N+, the condition ∆x∗i < 0 for all i ∈ N′− \N−
implies ∆x∗i < 0 for all i ∈ N−. This can be optimal for these firms, by the necessary
condition Eq. (8), only if there exists j /∈ N′− such that ∆x∗j > 0. By Eq. (25), again,
this can result only if N′+ ⊃ N+. Now, using the necessary conditions Eq. (8), we
obtain for all i ∈ N′−
x∗i
′ =
a+byi
2b
− 1
2∑j 6=i
x∗j
′, x∗i ≤
a+byi
2b
− 1
2∑j 6=i
x∗j
(the inequality on the right-hand side is an equality if i ∈ N−, but not necessarily for
i ∈ N′− \N−), and similarly for all i ∈ N′+,
x∗i
′ =
a− ci+byi
2b
− 1
2∑j 6=i
x∗j
′, x∗i ≥
a− ci+byi
2b
− 1
2∑j 6=i
x∗j .
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Hence, for all i ∈ N′− and j ∈ N′+, we obtain
x∗i +
1
2∑k 6=i
x∗k ≤ x∗i ′+
1
2∑k 6=i
x∗k
′, x∗j +
1
2 ∑k 6= j
x∗k ≥ x∗j ′+
1
2 ∑k 6= j
x∗k
′ (29)
and thus
x∗j
′− x∗j +
1
2
(x∗i
′− x∗i )≤
1
2 ∑k 6=i, j
(x∗k− x∗k ′)≤ x∗i ′− x∗i +
1
2
(x∗j
′− x∗j). (30)
This can be satisfied only if x∗j
′−x∗j ≤ x∗i ′−x∗i , which contradicts ∆x∗i < 0 and ∆x∗j > 0.
Hence, the equilibrium x∗ is unique.
Proof of Lemma 3.2 Assume an SPE (z∗,y∗,x∗) exists where x∗i (z∗,y∗) 6= z∗i for
some i ∈ N (the two cases x∗i < z∗i and x∗i > z∗i are distinguished below). We show
that i benefits by deviating unilaterally to z′i = x∗i (z∗,y∗) in stage 1. By Lemma
3.1, the choices of x∗(z′i,z∗−i,y∗) following this unilateral deviation are unique, and
hence the following quantities, which are mutual best responses, must be played:
x∗j(z′i,z∗−i,y∗) = x∗j(z∗,y∗) for all j 6= i, and x∗i (z′i,z∗−i,y∗) = z′i. The implied gain of
player i is −(x∗i − z∗i )γi if x∗i (z∗,y∗) < z∗i , and (x∗i − z∗i )(ci− γi) if x∗i (z∗,y∗) > z∗i .
Hence, the initially assumed strategy profile is not an SPE under the assumptions of
the Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3.4 The proof is made by logical induction starting in round T .
Assuming x−T ∈ R denotes the aggregate quantity of the players acting in previous
rounds, the first order condition for all i ∈ NT is Π′i = p− bxi− γi = 0, and hence
the aggregate quantity of all i ∈ NT is xaT = (a−bx−T − γi)/b∗ |NT |/(1+ |NT |). Fix
t ≤ T . Now assume that the aggregate quantity of all players acting in rounds t ′ ≥ t
can be expressed as a function of the aggregate quantity x−t of the players acting in
earlier rounds as follows.
xat =
βt
1+βt
· 1
b
(a−bx−t− γi) . (31)
Using βT = |NT |, this applies for t = T . The first order condition for all i ∈ Nt−1 is
Π′i = p−
1
βt
·bxi− γi = 0, (32)
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which allows us, in combination with Eq. (31) and p= a−b∑i xi, to express the price
as a function of x−(t−1) (the aggregate quantity prior to round t−1) as follows.
p− γi = 11+βt ∗ (|Nt−1|+1) · (a− γi−bx−(t−1)) (33)
Substituting this for p− γi in Eq. (32), again using Eq. (31), yields
xat−1 =
βt ∗ (|Nt−1|+1)
1+βt ∗ (|Nt−1|+1) ·
1
b
· (a− γi−bx−(t−1)). (34)
Hence, βt−1 = βt ∗ (|Nt−1|+1) =∏Tt ′=t−1(|Nt ′|+1), which thus applies for all t ≤ T .
For all t ≤ T and all i ∈ Nt , λi in Eq. (13) corresponds with β−1t+1 in Eq. (32), and thus
it confirms the first part of the lemma. The second part follows, since an equilibrium
corresponding with (λi) exists under the conditions of Proposition 4.1 if λi ≥ 1n for
all i ∈ N.
Proof of Proposition 3.5 Point 1. Fix any SPE (z∗,y∗,x∗), let p denote the cor-
responding market price, and define ri := a− b(z∗−i + 2z∗i − y∗i ) for all i. By Lemma
3.2, x∗i (z∗,y∗) = z∗i for all i ∈ N holds true along the path of play in any SPE. Thus,
p = a− b∑i x∗i = a− b∑i z∗i and ri = a− b(z−i + 2zi− yi) imply that the following
holds true in any SPE.
p = b(z∗i − y∗i )+ ri ∀i ∈ N (35)
In any SPE, ∂Πi∂zi = (p−bz∗i )∗
∂xi
∂zi −γi ≤ p−bz∗i −γi ≤ 0 holds true for ∂zi > 0. Due to
yi = 0 and Eq. (35), ri ≤ γi < ci follows for all i ∈ N. By Lemma 3.1, r j < c j implies
∂x j(z∗,y∗)/∂zi = 0 for ∂zi < 0, and combined, we obtain
∂x j(z∗,y∗)
∂zi = 0 for all i, j ∈ N.
This implies that the Cournot condition
∂Πi
∂zi
= p−bz∗i − γi = 0 ∀i ∈ N. (36)
is necessary. Since it also is sufficient, the unique solution is z∗i =
1
(n+1)b ∗
(
a+∑ j∈N γ j
)−
γi
b for all i ∈ N.
Point 2. Fix a strategy profile (z,y,x). Due to the assumption of sufficiently
similar (γi), we can focus on the case that all capacities are positive, which implies
that the induced market price is above marginal costs γi for all i ∈ N. Let p denote the
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induced market price. Hence, there exists a profile (λi)∈RN+ such that p−λibzi−γi =
0 for all i∈N. It is easy to verify that p−λibzi−γi = 0∀i∈N induces the equilibrium
outcome described in the proposition. Define k := #{ j ∈ N|λ j = 1}.
First we show that if (z,y,x) is an SPE, then λi ∈
[ 1
k+1 ,1
]
for all i ∈ N. To begin
with, note that xi > zi for some i ∈ N can result in equilibrium only if k = 1, λi = 1,
and λ j = 12 for all j 6= i. Otherwise, some j 6= i would benefit by deviating unilaterally
toward a higher z j in stage 1 (as j’s increase in stage 1 would crowd out i’s increase in
stage 2). This case implies λi ∈
[ 1
k+1 ,1
]
for all i∈N. In all alternative SPEs, capacity
must be fully pre-built in stage 1 (along the path of play). The condition that (z,y,x)
is an SPE implies λi ≤ 1 (for all i ∈ N), since i would otherwise benefit by increasing
zi unilaterally in stage 1 (note that no opponent responds to a small increase of zi by
decreasing quantity since p > γ j ⇔ λ j > 0 for all j 6= i). It implies λi ≥ 1k+1 (for all
i ∈ N), since i would otherwise be best off cutting capacity zi unilaterally in stage 1
(note that k players respond to i’s capacity cut by increasing quantity in stage 2).
Second we show that if λi ∈
[ 1
k+1 ,1
]
for all i ∈ N, then (z,y,x) is an SPE. To
begin with, p−λibzi− γi = 0 for all i implies (by Lemma 3.1) that quantities equate
with capacities in the unique stage 2 equilibrium. This confirms that capacity is fully
pre-built in this case. Now, λi ∈
[ 1
k+1 ,1
]
for all i∈N implies ∃i∈N : λi = 1, i.e. k≥ 1.
No player may benefit from extending capacity unilaterally in stage 1 because of
λi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N. Also, no player may benefit from cutting capacity since λi ≥ 1k+1
for all i with λi < 1 and λi ≥ 1k for all i with λi = 1 (note that k and k− 1 players,
respectively, respond to the capacity cut by extending quantity in stage 2).
B Results on two-stage games with homogeneous goods
Proof of Proposition 4.1 Fix a strategy profile (z,y,x∗) where x∗(z,y) is the stage-
2 Nash equilibrium for all (z,y). Let p denote the induced market price. We focus
on SPEs where ri = ci for all i ∈ N results along the path of play (it will be shown
that such SPEs exist, and it is easy to see that the set of outcomes of SPEs where
ri 6= ci for at least one i ∈ N is a subset of the outcomes derived in the following). To
abbreviate notation of directional derivatives, let ∇(∆zi,∆yi) f (z,y) denote the change
of f (which could be xi, x j, or Πi) if i changes (zi,yi) along (∆zi,∆yi). By Lemma
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3.2, directions (∆zi,∆yi) that induce ∇(∆zi,∆yi)x
∗
i (z,y) 6= 0 are generally sub-optimal.
Given the stage 2 solutions x∗i (z,y) from Eq. (25), it follows that we can focus on
directions (∆zi,∆yi) such that either (i) ∆zi > 0 and ∆yi ≤ 2∆zi, or (ii) ∆zi < 0 and
∆yi ≤ n+1n ∆zi. It further holds that if a deviation in any direction is profitable, then
either of the extreme deviations where ∆yi is bound by an equality must be profitable.
Consider first ∆zi > 0 and ∆yi = 2∆zi. By Eq. (25), this implies ∇(∆zi,∆yi)x
∗
i (z,y) = 0
and ∇(∆zi,∆yi)x
∗
j(z,y) = 0 for all j 6= i, and therefore
∇(∆zi,∆yi)Πi(z,y) = p−bzi− γi ≤ 0 (37)
has to be satisfied in equilibrium. Second consider ∆zi < 0 and ∆yi = n+1n ∆zi. By Eq.
(25), ∇(∆zi,∆yi)x
∗
i (z,y) = 0 and ∇(∆zi,∆yi)x
∗
j(z,y) =
1
n for all j 6= i result, which implies
that
∇(∆zi,∆yi)Πi(z,y) =−
(
p− 1nbzi− γi
)≤ 0 (38)
has to be satisfied. In turn, all (z,y) that satisfy both conditions are extended by the
stage-2 equilibria x∗ to an SPE. Hence, the necessary and sufficient condition for SPE
(conditional on the initial assumption ri = ci for all i∈N) can be expressed as follows.
∀i ∈ N ∃λi ∈
[1
n ,1
]
: p−λibzi− γi = 0 (39)
Hence, bzi = λ−1i p−λ−1i γi for all i, and since p = a−b∑i zi in equilibrium, this im-
plies p=
(
a+∑iλ−1i γi
)
/
(
1+∑iλ−1i
)
. Since λibzi = p−γi, see Eq. (39), it follows
that
λibzi =
1
1+∑ j λ−1j
(
a− γi+∑ j λ−1j (γ j− γi)
)
(40)
and that zi > 0 are positive for all i∈N and all (λi)∈
[1
n ,1
]N
if the (γi) are sufficiently
similar. Finally, ri = p− b(zi− yi), see Eq. (35), and p = λibzi + γi, see Eq. (39),
imply that the initial condition ri = ci is satisfied if byi = ci− γi+(1−λi)bzi. Since
λi ∈
[1
n ,1
]
, appropriate yi ≤ zi exist whenever ci is sufficiently close to γi. It is easy to
see that these (yi) do not contradict payoff maximization, since increasing yi implies
ri > ci, decreasing yi is payoff irrelevant, and directional variations of (zi,yi) are not
profitable due to the arguments made above.
Proof of Lemma 4.2 By a standard argument of upper hemicontinuity it follows
that the set of SPEs constructed for the case c ≈ γ in Prop. 4.1 remain SPEs when
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c = γ. Hence, the set of equilibrium outcomes (prices and profits) in case c = γ
contains all equilibrium outcomes that may result if c ≈ γ (where c > γ). It also
follows that all outcomes that may result in SPEs in case c = γ but not in case c ≈ γ
necessitate xi > zi for at least one i ∈ N along the path of play. It has to be shown that
the outcomes associated with such equilibria are in the set of equilibrium outcomes
even if c≈ γ. This follows, as it can be shown that all SPEs where xi > zi for at least
one i ∈ N along the path of play induce the Allaz-Vila outcome (price and profits).
The details are skipped.
Proof of Lemma 4.3 We show first that all payoff profiles Eq. (13) associated with
some (λi) ∈ [0,1]N where mini∈N λi < 1n are Pareto dominated by some (λ′i) ∈ [0,1]N
satisfying λ′i ≥ λi for all i ∈ N and λ′i > λi for at least one i ∈ N. Using r = 0, the
payoff of i ∈ N at (λi) can be expressed as, using hi(r) = (r+λ−1i )/λ−1i ,
Πi(r) =
1
λhi(r)i b
·
 a− γi
1+∑ j λ
−h j(r)
j
2 . (41)
The first derivative of Πi(r) with respect to r is proportional to
dΠi(r)
dr
∝−λi · lnλi+2 · ∑ j
lnλ j
1+∑ j λ−1j
(42)
and hence negative if λi = 1 (in this case, some j 6= i exists such that λ j < 1/n < 1).
Considering the case λi < 1, the aforementioned derivative of Πi is negative if
λi ·
(
1+∑ j λ−1j
)
< 2 ·∑
j
logλi λ j, (43)
which is generally satisfied if miniλi < 1n . As a result of dΠi/dr < 0 for all i ∈ N if
miniλi < 1n , for any (λi) ∈ [0,1]N where minλi < 1n there exists (λ′i) ∈
[1
n ,1
]N
such
that the payoff profile associated with (λi) is Pareto dominated by the one associated
with (λ′i). By Lemma 3.4 it thus follows that all outcomes of Stackelberg games are
either in the set of outcomes compatible with Prop. 4.1 or Pareto dominated by one
of those.
29
C Results on T -stage games with homogeneous goods
The proofs in this section use the following extended notation. The set of “states” is
denoted by T ×H with T = {1, . . . ,T} and H = Z×Y. Given any state (t,h), the
accumulated capacity is denoted as zi(h), and following Romano and Yildirim (2005)
we assume prior capacity investments are sunk. The capacity choices are therefore
strategies satisfying
zi : T ×H→ Zi s.t. zi(t,h)≥ zi(h) ∀(t,h). (44)
Similarly, the accumulated amount of forward trades is denoted as yi(h) for i∈N, and
following Allaz and Vila (1993), forward trades are cumulative, too.
yi : T ×H→ Yi s.t. yi(t,h)≥ yi(h) ∀(t,h) (45)
Finally, the quantity choice has to match the forward trades.
xi : H→ R s.t. xi(h)≥ yi(h) ∀h (46)
Strategies are tuples (zi,yi,xi) for all i ∈ N.
Proof of Lemma 4.4 Fix T ≥ 1 and any MPE (z,y,x) of Γ(T ). Construct a strategy
profile (z′,y′,x′) of Γ(T +1) as follows. (i) For all states (t,h) associated with some
t ≤ T maintain the strategies from Γ(T ), i.e. z′i(t,h) = zi(t,h) and y′i(t,h) = yi(t,h)
for all t ≤ T and h ∈ H. (ii) In the production period, set xi according to the unique
equilibrium x∗(h), for all h, derived in Lemma 3.1. (iii) For all states (t,h) associ-
ated with t = T + 1, set zi equal to the greater of zi(h) and xi(h), i.e. z′i(T + 1,h) =
max{zi(h),xi(h)}, and set y′i(T + 1,h) such that (for all i and h) p∗(h)− b(xi(h)−
y′i(T +1,h))≤ γi where p∗(h) := a−b∑ j x j(h). Appropriate y′i(T +1,h)≥ yi(h) ex-
ist for all h since, by Lemma 3.1, the xi(h) chosen in any SPE imply p∗(h)−b(xi(h)−
yi(h))≤ ci = γi for all i.
Note that (z′,y′,x′) is outcome equivalent to (z,y,x). It remains to be shown that
it is an MPE of Γ(T + 1). By construction the latter is satisfied for the production
period and also with respect to the y′i chosen in states (t,h) associated with round
t = T + 1 (they are payoff irrelevant). By Lemma 3.1, the fact that (z,y,x) is an
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MPE of Γ(T ) implies p∗− b(xi(h)− yi(h)) ∈ [0,γi] for all i and h, and this in turn
implies that z′i(T + 1,h) = max{zi(h),xi(h)} are mutual best responses in the states
associated with period T +1. Finally, note that the construction of (z′,y′,x′) implies
that for all states (t,h) with t = T and all action profiles viable in this state, the
profiles of continuation payoffs are identical under (z′,y′,x′) and (z,y,x). Hence,
action profiles that constitute mutual best responses in state (T,h) of Γ(T ) must also
be best responses in state (T,h) of Γ(T +1), and by backward induction, this applies
in all states (t,h) with t ≤ T .
Proof of Proposition 4.5 Fix any T ∗ ≤ T . The following derives the conditions
under which a given outcome can result in an MPE of Γ(T ∗) subject to the constraint
that the quantity sold forward is increased in every planning period of Γ(T ∗). By
Lemma 4.4, an outcome equivalent MPE of Γ(T ) exists. Hence, the set of outcomes
that can be sustained in MPEs of Γ(T ) is the union of all outcomes as derived next
over all T ∗ ≤ T . Considering Γ(T ∗), fix any state (t,h) where t = T ∗. Similarly to
the argument leading to Eq. (39), it can be shown that the necessary and sufficient
condition for MPE is (along the equilibrium path, where zi(T ∗,h) > zi(h) can be
assumed w.l.o.g.)
∀i ∈ N ∃λi ∈
[1
n ,1
]
: p∗(T ∗,h)−λib(zi(T ∗,h)− yi(h))− γi = 0, (47)
where p∗(T ∗,h) denotes the market price resulting along the equilibrium path condi-
tional on state (T ∗,h). Using p = a−b∑i zi it follows that
p∗(T ∗,h) =
1
1+∑iλ−1i
(
a+∑iλ−1i γi−b∑i yi(h)
)
(48)
Define βT ∗ := ∑iλ−1i . Thus, using γ= γ1 = · · ·= γn and y(h) = ∑i yi(h),
p∗(T ∗,h) =
(
a+βT
∗
γ−by(h)
)
/(1+βT
∗
). (49)
We now turn to states (t,h) in arbitrary rounds t ≤ T ∗. Define yT ∗i (t,h) as the quantity
that is going to be sold forward, prior to round T ∗ and conditional on the current state
(t,h), along the equilibrium path. The induction assumptions are (i) p∗(t,h) = (a+
βtγ−by(h))/(1+βt), which is satisfied for t = T ∗ using βT ∗ as defined above, and (ii)
yT
∗
i (t,h) = yi(h)+
p∗−γ
b ·αti, which is satisfied for t = T ∗ if αT
∗
i = 0 for all i ∈ N. By
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definition, the profit of i in state (t,h) is Πi(t,h) = (z∗i − yi(h))∗ (p− γi)+ p f ∗ yi(h),
for some constant p f and using z∗i as the capacity that is going to be built eventually
conditional on (t,h). Eq. (47) allows us to express z∗i as a function of yT
∗
i (·), and
the latter can be expressed as yT
∗
i (t + 1, ·) = yi(t,h) + p
∗−γ
b ·αt+1i by the induction
assumption. The following expression of Πi follows, neglecting the constant term
p f ∗ yi(h).
Πi(t,h) =
1
λib
(p∗− γ)2+
(
yi(t,h)+
p∗− γ
b
·αt+1i − yi(h)
)
· (p∗− γ) (50)
The first order conditions of maximizing Πi(t,h) over yi(t,h) yield, for all i ∈ N,
yi(t,h) = yi(h)+
p∗− γ
b
·
[
1+βt+1−2(αt+1i +λ−1i )
]
. (51)
Hence, αti = α
t+1
i +
[
1+βt+1−2(αt+1i +λ−1i )
]
= 1+βt+1−αt+1i −2λ−1i , and
∑
i∈N
yi(t,h) = ∑
i∈N
yi(h)+
p∗− γ
b
·
[
n∗ (1+βt+1)−2∑i(αt+1i +λ−1i )
]
. (52)
Using the induction assumption (i) p∗(t+1,h)= (a+βt+1γ−b∑i yi(t,h))/(1+βt+1),
p∗(t,h) =
a−by(h)+ γ ·
[
n+(n+1)βt+1−2∑i(αt+1i +λ−1i )
]
(n+1)∗ (1+βt+1)−2∑i(αt+1i +λ−1i )
It follows that βt = n+(n+1)βt+1−2∑i(αt+1i +λ−1i ), and recursively both (αti) and
βt are thus well-defined for all t ≤ T ∗. Since yi(h) = 0 for all i∈N in t = 1 (no output
is sold forward prior to round 1), Eq. (48) thus yields the equilibrium price, Eq. (47)
yields the equilibrium capacity/quantity for all i ∈ N, and yT ∗i (1,h) = 0+ p
∗−γ
b ·α1i
for all i ∈ N. The equilibrium profit Eq. (19) follows from Eq. (50), using t = 1 and
y1i = 0 for all i. To see that βt is increasing in T ∗, resolve the recursive definition of
βt . If T ∗− t is even,
βt = βt+1+n(βt+1−2βt+2+2βt+3−·· ·+ · · ·−2βT ∗−1)+2βT ∗ (53)
βt+1 = βt+2+n(βt+2−2βt+3+2βt+4−·· ·+ · · ·+2βT ∗+1)−2βT ∗ (54)
and (partially) substituting for βt+1, we obtain βt = βt+1+(n−1)(βt+1−βt+2) and
the expression provided in the proposition. The same applies if T ∗− t is odd. Note
βT ∗−1− βT ∗ = n+(n− 2)βT ∗ and βT ∗ = ∑iλ−1i . Hence βt → ∞ as well as p→ γ
when T ∗ → ∞. Resolving the recursive definition of αti yields, for all i ∈ N, αti =
∑T
∗
τ=t+1(1+βτ−2λ−1i )∗ (−1)T
∗−τ+1.
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D Proof of Proposition 5.1
Lemma D.1. Assume |N| = 2 and pi = a− b1zi− b2z j for all i ∈ N. If pi− (zi−
yi)/µi− γi = 0 for all i ∈ N, then
pi =
(1+b1µ j)Ai−b2µ jA j
(1+b1µi)(1+b1µ j)−b22µiµ j
(55)
for all i ∈ N, using Ai := a−b1
[
yi−µiγi
]−b2[y j−µ jγ j] for all i.
Proof. Using zi = yi+µi(pi− γi) and pi = a−b1zi−b2z j, we obtain
pi = a−b1
[
yi+µi(pi− γi)
]−b2[y j +µ j(p j− γ j)] (56)
(1+b1µi)pi+b2µ j p j = a−b1
[
yi−µiγi
]−b2[y j−µ jγ j]=: Ai, (57)
i.e. an equation system implying(
1+b1µi
b2µ j
− b2µi
1+b1µ j
)
pi =
1
b2µ j
Ai− 11+b1µ j A j (58)
which yields the result.
Lemma D.2. If pi− (zTi − yt+1i )/µi− γi = 0 for all i ∈ N, then pi− (zTi − yti)/(−µi−
1/ri)− γi = 0 for all i ∈ N, using ri := d pTi /dyt+1i .
Proof. The expected profit in round t is
Πi(t,h) =
(
zTi − yti
)∗ (pi− γi)+ p fi ∗ yti (59)
using pi− (zTi − yt+1i )/µi− γi = 0 and dropping the constant term p fi ∗ yti yields
Πneti (t,h) = µi ∗ (pi− γi)2+(yt+1i − yti)∗ (pi− γi) (60)
Now, using ri := d pTi /dy
t+1
i , the first order conditions dΠ
net
i /dy
t+1
i = 0 for both i
become
µi ∗2ri(pi− γi)+(pi− γi)+ ri(yt+1i − yti) = 0 (61)
and thus
yt+1i = y
t
i− (pi− γi)∗ (2µi+1/ri) (62)
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Substituting this for yt+1i in the initially assumed equilibrium condition pi− (zTi −
yTi )/µi− γi = 0, we obtain
pi−
[
zTi − yti +(pi− γi)∗ (2µi+1/ri)
]
/µi− γi = 0 (63)
and the result follows.
Lemma D.3. The limit of (µti) as t→−∞ is µ = (b21−b22)−1/2.
Proof. Using the definition of (µti,µ
t
j),
µti =
(1+b1µt+1i )(1+b1µ
t+1
j )−b22µt+1i µt+1j
b1(1+b1µt+1j )−b22µt+1j
−µt+1i (64)
its fixed points µt = µt+1 satisfy
µi =
(1+b1µi)(1+b1µ j)−b22µiµ j
b1(1+b1µ j)−b22µ j
−µi (65)
which yields (b21−b22)µiµ j+b1(µi−µ j) = 1. Since this is true for all i 6= j, it implies
µi = µ j in the limit, i.e. (b21−b22)µ2 = 1 as claimed. Since this fixed point is unique,
it must also be the limit of the sequence as t→−∞.
Lemma D.4. Assume |N| = 2 and pi = a− b1zi− b2z j for all i ∈ N. The Bertrand
profits are characterized as
pi− zi/
(
b1
b21−b22
)
− γi = 0 ∀i ∈ N. (66)
Proof. The demand functions are
zi =
b1(a− pi)−b2(a− p j)
b21−b22
(67)
for all i ∈ N, and hence, profit and first order conditions are
Πi = (pi− γi)∗ b1(a− pi)−b2(a− p j)b21−b22
(68)
Π′i =
b1(a− pi)−b2(a− p j)
b21−b22
+(pi− γi)∗ −b1b21−b22
= 0 (69)
⇒ pi− zi/
(
b1
b21−b22
)
− γi = 0. (70)
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Lemma D.5. Fix λ1 = λ2. The equilibrium price (Prop. 5.1) is decreasing in T ∗.
Proof. By definition, λ1 = λ2 implies µt1 = µ
t
2 =: µ
t for all t and µ1 is increasing in
T ∗. By Eq. (72), the equilibrium price satisfies pi− zTi /µ1i −γi = 0 for all i ∈ N. First,
consider the case b2 > 0 and assume (for contradiction) that the price is not decreasing
in µ. Thus, there exist µ′ > µ′′ and p′i > p′′i , p′j R p′′j such that p′i− zTi /µ′− γi = 0 and
p′′i − zTi /µ′′− γi = 0.
pi =
(1+b1µ)(a+b1µγi+b2µγ j)−b2µ(a+b1µγ j +b2µγi)
(1+b1µ)2−b22µ2
(71)
and its derivative with respect to µ is negative if[
(1+b1µ)(b1γi+b2γ j)−b2µ(b1γ j +b2γi)
]∗ [(1+b1µ)2−b22µ2]
<
[
(1+b1µ)(a+b1µγi+b2µγ j)−b2µ(a+b1µγ j +b2µγi)
]∗ [b1(1+b1µ)−b22µ]
Case 1: b2 > 0. The negativity condition is equivalent to
(b1γi+b2γ j)−b2(b1µγ j +b2µγi)
< b1(1+b1µ)2a−b2µb1(1+b1µ)a−b22µ(1+b1µ)a+b32µ2a
and in case 0 < b2 < b1, this is satisfied, since (using µ > 1/b1)
b1γi(1−b1µ)+b2γ j(1−b1µ)< b1a+b21µ(a−a)
Case 2: b2 < 0. The negativity condition is equivalent to
b1(γi−b1µa)+b2γ j +b2b1µ(a− γ j)−b22µγi
< ab1+µa(b21−b22)+b1µ2a(b21−b22)−b2µ2a(b21−b22)
and since a > γi, a > γ j, µ > 1/b1, and |b1|> |b2|, this is generally true if b2 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5.1 Similar to above, we can show that a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for equilibrium in round T is pi− (zTi − yTi )/λ−1i b−11 − γi = 0 for all
i ∈ N. Using µTi = λ−1i b−11 and t = T , this condition can be expressed as follows.
pi− (zTi − yti)/µti− γi = 0 ∀i ∈ N. (72)
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By Lemma D.1, this implies
rti := d p
t
i/dy
t
i =
−b1(1+b1µtj)+b22µtj
(1+b1µti)(1+b1µ
t
j)−b22µtiµtj
(73)
for all t. In addition, by Lemma D.2, for all t < T ,
µti =−µt+1i −1/rt+1i . (74)
The equilibrium price follows from Lemma D.1 for t = 1 and y1i = 0 for all i ∈ N.
The convergence of µ is established in Lemma D.3 and the µB characterizing price
competition follows from Lemma D.4. By Eq. (62), the amount sold forward in round
t is
yt+1i − yti =−(pi− γi)∗ (2µt+1i +1/r+1i )≡ (pi− γi)∗ (µti−µt+1i ), (75)
where µti > µ
t+1
i follows from its definition. Finally, the fact that pi is decreasing in
T ∗ follows from Lemma D.5.
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